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P. O. B. 653, Beer Sheva
84105 Israel
mfried@bgumail.bgu.ac.il
The phrase, ‘Mathematics for All’, has a certain ambiguity. It may be taken as an
exhortation -- ‘Mathematics for all!’, or as an indication of a special kind of
mathematics, ‘mathematics-for-all’. These two ways of reading the phrase can be
translated into two closely related questions: 1) Should mathematics really be for all?
and 2) Are there aspects of mathematics, or parts of mathematics, truly appropriate
for all? Since one question inevitably leads to the other, the ambiguity of
‘mathematics for all’ reveals only that there are two sides to this one coin. We shall
begin, then, with the first question and conclude with the second.

I.
Asking whether mathematics should be taught to everyone presupposes that
mathematics is something everyone is able to do. As we all too painfully know, there
are plenty of people happy to confess that mathematics was something they never
could do. There are also, at the other extreme, those sanguine pedagogues who
earnestly believe that one can learn anything if only properly taught. The truth, of
course, lies somewhere in between. For no one can doubt that people have limits.
But, people also have potential, and they can learn more than they think and they have
learned more than often they are willing to say. Thus, defining the limits of students’
ability, finding ways to teach students what they can learn, and developing methods of
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evaluation that reveal what students have learned are, without a doubt, legitimate
goals for educators, and, in fact, are the mainstay for most educational researchers. In
this piece, however, I am advancing this concern: that the question of whether
mathematics should be taught to everyone should not be dismissed by the argument of
“impregnable barrier of inability,” and that, therefore, it is at least reasonable to ask
whether, indeed, there is some urgency to the idea that mathematics should be for all.
To begin, one should recognize that mathematics was not always considered an
essential part of the school curriculum. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, for
example, manyhumanist thinkers argued against the importance of mathematics as a
basic component in general education. Ironically, their reason had to do with the
relevance of mathematics to human life. As Geoffery Howson says,
“Indeed, mathematics held little appeal for the humanists. Vives was
something of an exception, although even he had qualifications to as a
component of general education. Erasmus considered it a subject which
those sufficiently far advanced might ‘taste’, but, in general, the
humanists were not attracted by a purely abstract, as geometry. The effect
of the humanist movement on the school curriculum can be seen in the
timetable of a typical Elizabethan grammar school.”1
Even at the turn of the nineteen century, one finds in Germany, for example, that
“...mathematics was taught as a marginal subject at best, given the near-monopolistic
status of the classical languages.”2 Indeed, one tends to forget that elementary school
was until fairly recently still commonly known as “grammar school,” betraying its
principal traditional function of teaching Latin and Greek grammar.
One might expect that among the Greeks, whose mathematical accomplishments
were so great and so much a part of everything we think of as Greek, there would be
an unequivocal recognition of the importance of mathematical education for all. Yet,
when Protagoras describes to Socrates the kind of education fit for the children of the
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polis, he says that “...when the boys have learned their letters and are ready to
understand the written word as formerly the spoken, they set the works of good poets
before them on their desks to read and make them learn them by heart, poems
containing much admonition and many stories, eulogies, and panegyrics of the good
men of old, so that the child may be inspired to imitate them and long to be like
them.”3 As for the other aspects of elementary education, Protagoras speaks of music4
by which youth will “...become more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in
themselves and so more capable in whatever they say or do...,” and of gymnastics “so
that a good mind may have a good body to serve it, and no one be forced by physical
weakness to play the coward in war and other ordeals.”5 Protagoras’ program is, more
or less, Socrates’ own initial proposal, in Books II and III of the Republic, for the
education of children who are to become the guardians of the ideal state. Moreover,
later in the dialogue, when Socrates reviews this initial proposal with Glaucon to find
out what might be missing, Glaucon says, “...what other study is left apart from music,
gymnastics, and the arts?”6 Ian Mueller makes the obvious observation: “In neither
case is there a mention of anything mathematical,”7 and goes on to say that, despite an
apparent common ability to perform calculations such as 2000/10 and 3x700,8 “...it
appears that the average Athenian citizen knew remarkable little arithmetic from our
point of view and that he did not acquire his knowledge in school. But even if he did
learn arithmetic at school, we have no right to assume he learned any geometry,
astronomy, or music theory, despite the fact that we have plenty of evidence
associating these subjects with the intellectual heights of fifth-century culture.”9
The expectation one has that the Greeks should promote universal mathematics
education is, of course, not completely unfounded. In the passage quoted above from
the Republic, Plato, in the voice of Socrates, points out to Glaucon that the guardians’
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education lacks training in the mathematical sciences, arithmetic, geometry, and
astronomy. In the case of geometry, Glaucon recognizes the practical importance of
geometry, especially in the conduct of war: “For in dealing with encampments and
the occupation of strong places and the bringing of troops into column and line and all
the other formations of an army in actual battle and on the march, an officer who had
studied geometry would be a very different person from what he would be if he had
not.”10 Socrates does not deny this practical importance, but says that these
applications only require “...a slight modicum of geometry and calculation...”;
Socrates thinks that the study of geometry (as he does the other mathematical
sciences) turns one’s soul to the true being of things and eventually to the idea of the
good itself.11 One must keep in mind, however, that even here the dialogue is
referring to the education of an elite, the education of the guardians, the future rulers
of the ideal state, not the education of all. Plato himself perhaps recognizes the
desirability of all citizens of a republic to have some true understanding of
mathematics, but he has profound reservations about the ability to achieve such a goal.
This is clear from a well known passage in the Laws, in which the Athenian says to
Clinias, the Cretan, that “...there are, of course, three subjects for the freeborn still to
study. Ciphering and arithmetic make one subject; mensuration, linear, superficial,,
and solid, taken as one single study, forms a second; the third is the true relations of
the planetary orbits to one another. The elaborate prosecution of all these studies into
their minute details is not for the masses but for a select few...For the multitude it will
be proper to learn so much of the matter as is indispensable, and as it may truly be
said to be a disgrace to the common man not to know, though it would be hard, or
actually impossible, to pursue the research into minute detail.”12
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II.
Plato’s discussion of the importance of mathematics education is, as we have just
said, was directed towards the future leaders of Athens or the select few who become
guardians of the ideal state. Democratic traditions have developed since then, and we
now tend to see all children as future leaders, or, at least, this is our rhetoric in
speaking about such things.13 This is why, perhaps, the justifications given for
mathematics education for an elite within the text of the Platonic dialogues, and two
in particular,14 are still familiar mutatis mutandis as justifications of mathematics for
all. Thus, most arguments supporting mathematics for all are elaborations of two
basic claims: 1) that mathematics is useful, and 2) that mathematics leads to a way of
thinking that allows one to understand other things beyond mathematics itself. Not
much needs to be said about the first. As for the second, Plato thought that
mathematics could lead to thinking about things in themselves, for mathematical
objects were, for Plato, intermediaries between the ever-changing things of this world
and the world of completely unchanging and intelligible forms where one can find the
true source of human knowledge and, more importantly, of human justice.15 One
usually hears the second claim in a form in which Plato’s emphasis on the objects of
mathematical thinking has been redirected to the character of mathematical thinking
itself, its precision and its rigor.16 The stress on the importance of mathematics as a
problem-solving activity, for example, is one version of this claim. Indeed, the
interest in problem-solving would not be nearly so extensive if one thought that
problem-solving in mathematics had nothing to do with problem-solving in other
aspects of our lives.

6
The two claims listed above, that mathematics is useful and that mathematics aids
thinking in general, certainly make mathematics a worthy subject, but are they truly
arguments showing that mathematics should be taught to everyone? They are, of
course, to the extent one considers schools as democratic institutions, that is, as
institutions that serve democracy. In general, the centrality of education in
determining a successful democracy is common to almost all thinking about
democracy. In Thomas Jefferson’s thought, for example, one cannot separate the
concern for the health of the republic and the education of its citizens.17 Thus, in the
preamble to his “Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge” (1779), Jefferson
writes, “Whereas it appeareth that however certain forms of government are better
calculated than others to protect individuals in the free exercise of their natural rights,
and are at the same time themselves better guarded against degeneracy, yet experience
hath shewn, that even under the best forms, those entrusted with power have, in time,
and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny; and it is believed that the most
effectual means of preventing this would be, to illuminate, as far as practicable, the
minds of the people at large, and more especially to give them knowledge of those
facts, which history exhibiteth, that, possessed thereby of the experience of other ages
and countries, they may be enabled to know ambition under all its shapes, and prompt
to exert their natural powers to defeat its purposes.”18 In Jefferson’s vision of
education, there was, moreover, no question as to the importance of mathematics and
the sciences in general for this end. Accordingly, he says that in the grammar schools
(roughly equivalent to our high-school) “...shall be taught the Latin and Greek
languages, English grammar, geography, and the higher part of numerical
arithmetick, to wit, vulgar and decimal fractions, and the extraction of the square and
cube roots [emphasis added].”19 Jefferson’s sense that an enlightened polity means,
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among other things, a polity that is no stranger to scientific thought is clear also from
his proposed program of studies for the University of Virginia, which included under
the heading “Mathematics, pure,” “Algebra; Fluxions [calculus]; Geometry,
Elementary, Transcendental; Architecture [!], Military, Naval,” and under the heading
“Physico-Mathematics,” “Mechanics; Statics; Dynamics; Pneumatics; Acoustics;
Optics; Astronomy; Geography.”20 Indeed, these make up almost a third of the total
subjects to be taught at the university.
That mathematics is both useful and develops clear analytical thinking, needless
to say, fit well into the Jeffersonian scheme. Obviously, clear analytic thinking, the
ability to form arguments and counter-arguments, the power to discern sham
reasoning, and the habit of being precise about terms form a firm defense against the
perversion of a good government into a tyranny. The democratic implication of
mathematics’ utility, on the other hand, is evident not only in its allowing a wider
range of people to make a positive contribution to society, but also in its removing the
barriers which might prevent people taking up more sophisticated and lucrative
professions (particularly, one might add, professions to which political power is
attached). Jefferson makes the last point plain when he writes that “[At the district
schools] might be taught English grammar, the higher branches of numerical
arithmetic, the geometry of straight lines and of the circle, the elements of navigation,
and geography to a sufficient degree, and thus afford the greater numbers the means of
being qualified for the various vocations of life, needing more instruction than merely
menial or praedial labor...”21 In one of its “modern” incarnations, the argument from
utility is the “technology argument” – we live in a technological society, mathematics
is indispensable in technology, therefore, the mathematics is essential to success in
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society. For many, the “technology argument” is the most potent argument implying
the endorsement of mathematics education for all.
Yet, despite the plausibility of the two arguments given so far for mathematics
for all, something about them, nevertheless, does not ring true. To begin, consider the
arguments claiming that it is the usefulness of mathematics that gives mathematics
for all its urgency. These have a wide range. At the crudest level -- though, I must
sadly confess, the argument here is a very common one – one makes the case that
acceptance into universities or other institutions or organizations is barred for anyone
who cannot demonstrate some proficiency in mathematics, proficiency that is usually
determined by an examination or school grades. The kindest comment one can make
regarding the “institutional utility” of mathematics is that it begs the question.
Anyone who genuinely cares about mathematics, however, should further object that
the argument to “institutional utility,” in fact, discounts any deeper use of
mathematics beyond its being a mere device for selection, a capacity for which it
would be an arbitrary choice except for the fact that most people find mathematics
hard. Though this is, I admit, a use, and one does use such words as “device” or
“tool” to describe mathematics in this very instrumental role; it is not really a use of
mathematics per se since it is related, at best, only tangentially to its content.
As for the “technology argument,” there is no doubt that mathematics has had a
decisive role in the development of the machines and systems that we have come so
much to depend on, and there is no sign that the importance of mathematics here will,
in the future, in any way diminish. Thus, it is not an arbitrary policy that future
computer engineers be required to have a relatively deep understanding of, say,
combinatorics, probability, and number theory. But what of the users of technology?
After all, while the number of people who actually devise some new technology is
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relatively small, there is hardly a person, in the developed world at least, who does not
use fairly advanced technology almost every day. For users of technology, however,
the importance of knowing what makers of technology know is not at all clear.
Indeed, it is almost in the very nature of technology that knowledge of the inner
workings of machines becomes progressively irrelevant for those who only use
machines. Thus, as the writer Robert O’Brien says,
“Increasingly, engineers are designing people out of the machine process.
The purposes are practical: to eliminate human error, fatigue, boredom; to
introduce faster, safer, more economical and consistent methods of
production; to fulfill the incessant human striving for abundance. And
even as their designers toil, the machines themselves seem to be groping
more and more toward self-sufficiency, impelled by the same blind will
with which a vine climbs toward the sun. The telephone system that
began with hand cranks and ‘Hello’ girls is today a marvel of automatic
control. In place of the philosophic elevator man who joked about his ‘ups
and downs’ is a panel of plastic push buttons.”22
As a technology progresses, it seems, one needs to be less and less of a
specialist to use it; the development of a technology is marked by increasing
“user-friendliness.” This means that mere functioning in a technological world
does not depend on knowing its technological foundations. However,
functioning intelligently in the technological world does, I think, involve an
understanding of its conceptual foundations; one should know, for example, the
difference between the “precision” of 3.1415926 and the “precision” of π. This
implies an approach which is more reflective and less attached to immediate
applications; one might conceive such a reflective approach as still directed
towards mathematics’ usefulness but, it must be granted, only in an equivocal
sense. Similar things could be said regarding mathematics’ usefulness in the
exact sciences.

10
Mathematics as a path to general types of thinking is, in a sense, also an assertion of
the usefulness of mathematics, and it is a very strong one at that. With that, however,
it is also open to the same criticism regarding the “institutional utility” of
mathematics, namely, that thinking of mathematics in this light makes the content of
mathematics of only secondary importance, if important at all. But, beyond that
criticism, one wonders about the truth of the claim itself. Consider the most common
version of the claim: namely, that “A strong emphasis on mathematical concepts and
understandings ... supports the development of problem solving.”23 The first question
one should ask is, What kind of problems are meant here? As I mentioned above, the
very strength of the claim comes from its referring to problems other than purely
mathematical ones. Certainly, Pólya, to whom we owe this concentration on problem
solving in mathematics education probably more than anyone else, saw his work on
heuristics as applicable to areas other than mathematics, for he saw problem solving
as, in some way, central to all thought. In fact, “The tenet underlying all of Pólya’s
writing and teaching on problem solving was that if taught and learned appropriately,
mathematics improves the mind and implants good habits of thought.”24 But Pólya
began with mathematical problems, his books concentrate on mathematical problems,
and one suspects that his many beautiful insights relate most properly only to
mathematical problems or problems that can be framed as mathematical problems.
The sad fact, though, is that, despite the optimism born in the 16th and 17th centuries
that all problems would eventually be open to a mathematical-like treatment,25 most
real-life problems of real significance still remain outside the realm of mathematics.
This is because such real-life problems involve, more often than not, a judgment of
ends rather than a choice of means. Thus, Eva T. H. Brann writes:

11
“The presumption in coming to school to learn to solve human problems
is that human affairs are amenable to something like an algebraic
treatment, that they can be clearly formulated in terms of knowns and
unknowns, and that they maybe foretold as well as resolved by an
application of the proper technique. It is a faith encouraged by certain
academics who, though no less mere theoreticians than any of their
colleagues, want to invest their subject with irresistible urgency. Be that
as it may, the mere formulation of such a problem represents...so
enormous a rational determination that students need a thorough
intellectual foundation to give them some critical independence with
respect to the whole genre of theories constructed for practical
applications.”26
The “thorough intellectual foundation” Brann speaks about clearly contains some
thoughtful exposure to mathematics, but it is far from clear that mathematics has any
dominant part here; even Jefferson, whom we cited as a supporter of scientific
education, still saw history, and not mathematics, as probably the most important of
one’s studies.27

III.
There is no denying that, while most problems of deep concern to citizens and policy
makers alike are not amenable to the type of thinking one applies in mathematical
problems, still the range of questions for which mathematical reasoning is relevant is
very great. This is certainly true in the exact sciences where attempts to remove the
mathematical presentation usually result in an oversimplification at best and a
complete distortion of the facts at worst.28 Therefore, I do not disagree that for a true
understanding of the exact sciences, at least, one needs a firm grasp of its
mathematical underpinning. The question is, however, as it was in my remarks about
technology, whether this is an appropriate argument for mathematics for all. What
shall we say to the student who has no interest whatsoever in physics or computer
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science? Here, I would like to return to the passage from Plato’s Laws quoted at the
end of the first section. For besides the two arguments we derived from that and the
passage from the Republic, there is, I think, another more subtle argument in the
former.
At the end of the passage from the Laws, the Athenian says that it is a disgrace
for the citizens not to know the details of mathematical researches. The sort of
disgrace I think Plato has in mind can be illustrated by the apocryphal story told about
Plato and the doubling of the cube: “Eratosthenes in his work entitled Platonicus
relates that, when the god proclaimed to the Delians by the oracle that, if they would
get rid of a plague, they should construct an altar double of the existing one, their
craftsmen fell into great perplexity in their efforts to discover how a solid could be
made double of a (similar) solid; they therefore went to ask Plato about it, and he
replied that the oracle meant, not that the god wanted an altar of double the size, but
that he wished, in setting them the task, to shame the Greeks [emphasis added] for
their neglect of mathematics and their contempt for geometry.”29 The twist in the
story, of course, is that the shame the Delians were to feel was not that from a sense
of ineptness before a practical task, although they were led to believe that it was a
practical task they were to carry out, and thought, accordingly, that it was a job for
their craftsmen.30 The Delians’ shame was in not knowing the deeper foundations of
their own altar; their contempt for geometry meant that they were not, in some way,
in full possession of their own world. The lesson of the story, then, is that knowing
mathematics and not scorning geometry is important at bottom not because it allows
one to solve practical problems, though it may do this, but because it allows one more
fully to belong in one’s own world, and, therefore, the neglect of mathematics is a
disgrace not for the craftsman alone among the Delians, but for all the Delians.
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The need to belong, I think, provides a sound motivation for mathematics for
all. The sense of belonging that one aims for, however, applies to the greater world,
the natural world, the world that science contemplates, as well as the more provincial
world of one’s own culture.
I want to end this piece with some remarks about the latter; these remarks also
touch on the kind of mathematics appropriate for all, the second side of the coin with
which this essay began. To start, I do not want to consider the presence of
mathematical thinking in different cultures, though this has in recent years become a
lively area of research with many impressive findings. I only want to stress that
mathematics has a central place in western culture, and, therefore, mathematics is as
much a part of cultural education as the study of literature is. In the English speaking
world, one reads Shakespeare not because one aims to be a Shakespearean scholar but,
to borrow Plato’s phrase, because it is a disgrace for an English speaker never once to
have savored a line of Shakespeare’s English. It should be as natural to expect
someone in the western world to have savored Euclid’s proof of Pythagoras’ theorem.
Yet, this is not the case. One tends to see the reading of works by mathematicians and
scientists as a somewhat esoteric activity reserved for historians, biographers and
archivists. There is, in this way, a kind of double standard in education. For at any
level of education it is taken for granted that the study of literature is the study of the
works of literature; hardly anyone doubts the inadequacy of a mere textbook approach
to literature in which the stories of Shakespeare’s tragedies are merely told or the
themes in Frost’s poetry merely listed. In mathematics education, however, the
textbook approach is the only approach. Accordingly, our students end up, more often
than not, only with a textbook understanding of the subject; they are not left with the
sense of having faced great ideas of great thinkers, a sense which can truly enrich and
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inspire.31 Emerson said that “Activity is contagious. Looking where others look, and
conversing with the same things, we catch the charm which lured them...Talk much
with any man of vigorous mind, and we acquire very fast the habit of looking at things
in the same light, and on each occurrence we anticipate his thought.”32 One seems
painfully aware of this in literature education but oblivious to it in mathematics
education.
The approach to learning mathematics by reading works of mathematics33 would
be misconstrued if it were taken as a purely historical approach. It involves, rather,
the recognition that living mathematics is a product of the imagination of real
people.34 I mean this quite seriously: mathematics is a fundamentally human
endeavor, as much as literature, and must be studied in this way; it is not so much a
matter of knowing Euclid did this or Gauss did that, but that this thought is in Euclid
this and this in Gauss. Tymoczko makes a distinction similar to the one I am trying to
make when he says, “It is mathematics with a human face because there is no
mathematical discipline without a human face. Stories of mathematicians are ‘color’.
It is interesting that Tartaglia was a stammerer who extracted a promise from
Cardano. But stories about what historical individuals say when they looked on the
mathematical universe at historical points of time are not color. They are
mathematics. No one can learn mathematics without being inculcated into this
tradition.”35 One might say that this is precisely the historical approach, and perhaps I
would say so too if it were not so common to think of the historical approach in the
pejorative sense of being about dead ideas. I am not proposing ‘mathematics for all’
consists in learning dead ideas. One thinks one can ignore great works such as
Euclid’s Elements or Descartes’ La Géométrie as being no longer relevant, or
Shakespeare’s plays as no longer current, but this is like thinking that one can come
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into the middle of a conversation and still really know what is going on. Indeed, being
engaged in the reading of such great works is, as Robert Hutchins put it, to be
engaged in a “great conversation.”36 Thus, while it does not seem to me an injustice
not to provide one with technical training for a scientific profession that one does not
really want, it does seem to me an injustice to keep one out of this “great
conversation,” for this is something truly belonging to everyone in society and is
behind any sense of belonging in one’s culture. What allows one to participate fully
in this “conversation,” therefore, should be our guide in thinking about ‘mathematics
for all’, both in its justification and its content. And it is the humanizing participation
in the ‘great conversation’ that makes ‘mathematics for all’ deeply humanistic
mathematics.
1

Geoffrey Howson, A History of Mathematical Education in England, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982, p.9. One hears, I think, an echoes of the humanists’ complaint regarding
mathematics whenever our students challenge us with the question, “What good is all this
mathematics?,” by which they do not mean what are its applications in science and technology (that they
have been told, ad nauseam), but what is its relevance to their everyday troubles and pleasures, to
passions, and to genuinely human dilemmas.
2
Gert Schubring, “Germany to 1933” in the Companion Encyclopedia of the History and Philosophy of
the Mathematical Sciences, I. Grattan-Guinness ed., Vol. II, p.1443.
3

Plato, Protagoras, 325e-326a.
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Music must be understood here in the wider sense of music and poetry. Later, of course, the study
music, that is, of music theory became a strictly mathematical science associated, in particular, with
certain aspects of the theory of proportion. Indeed, Euclid wrote a book about music theory, as did
Ptolemy, and, by the Middle Ages, music became one of the four mathematical sciences included in the
quadrivium (see Theodore C. Karp “Music,” in The Seven Liberal Arts in the Middle Ages, David L.
Wagner, ed. (Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1983)).
5

Ibid., 326b-c.
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Republic, 522b.
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Ian Mueller, “Mathematics and Education: Some Notes on the Platonic Program,”
in ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΜΑΘΗΜΑΤΩΝ , special edition of Apeiron, vol.XXIV, number 4, December 1991, p.87.
The absence of mathematics in the Greek curriculum is evident also in Aristotle’s account of this in the
Politics: “The customary branches of education are in number four; they are—(1) reading and writing,
(2) gymnastic exercises, (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of these, reading and
writing and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety of ways, and gymnastic
exercises are thought to infuse courage. Concerning music a doubt may be raised—in our own day most
men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in education, because nature

16

herself, as has been often said, requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure
(schol ) well...” (VIII, 1337b). Ernest Barker attributes the absence of scientific subjects in Aristotle’s
scheme to the purely political goal of education of making good citizens (a point we shall consider soon
in our discussion of Jefferson’s views). Thus he writes: “Not only does [Aristotle] regard the State,
rather than the individual, as the primary object of attention; but he also regards character rather than
knowledge as the end to be sought, and will rather than intelligence as the subject to be trained and
developed. This being the aim of education in Aristotle’s conception, there will result certain
differences between the means of education which he prefers to use, and those which we employ.
Working on the intelligence, we use the means that influence the development of intelligence, the
subtleties of grammar, the abstractions of mathematics: working on the will, he lays stress upon those
influences which are calculated to mould the will insensibly, such as the fascination of noble music or
the attraction of great literature” (The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Dover
Publications, 1959), p.424).
8

Mueller is relying here on passages from Aristophanes’ Wasps and Plato’s Hippias Minor,
respectively.
9

Mueller, op. cit., p.88. Thomas Heath thinks that arithmetic was included in children’s education at an
early stage. He says, “The main subjects [of elementary education] were letters (reading and writing
followed by dictation and the study of literature), music and gymnastics; but there is no reasonable
doubt that practical arithmetic (in our sense), including weights and measures, was taught along with
these subjects [emphasis added]” (A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1921, reprinted by Dover Publications, Inc., 1981), I, 18-19). However, the point is that, whether or not
mathematics was included in the basic education of Athenian youth in fact, neither Protagoras nor
Glaucon see it as an obvious enough component of elementary education to mention it in their
descriptions; for them, it seems, “the three R’s” of education were Reading, Rhythm, and wRestling!
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Rep.,326d.
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Ibid., 326eff.
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Plato, Laws, VII, 817e-818b. I mention, incidentally, that this Platonic dialogue, Plato’s last dialogue
and the only one in which Socrates neither appears nor is mentioned, also contains interesting
observations about the use of games and play in the teaching of mathematics (VII, 819b-d).
13
This is, naturally, an oversimplification to some extent. For one still considers leaders a chosen few.
At the same time, we do see the reservoir from which we choose our leaders as much more extensive
than one did in past times and we choose much later. Moreover, whereas Plato had in mind leaders in
the narrow political sense, that is, leaders as rulers, we see leadership as a much more varied thing, and,
accordingly, speak of not only political leaders, but also of intellectual leaders, spiritual leaders, moral
leaders, and so on. One can see this wider view in Robert Ulich’s definition of leadership in his essay,
“Leadership and Education” ( in Vital Issues in American Education, Alice and Lester D. Crow, eds.
(New York: Bantam Books, 1963)): “We define a leader as a person capable of inspiring other people
with a desire to follow his direction and example for the achievement of purposes considered desirable
by those who represent the best of the conscience and consciousness of their community. Since a
community is a part of humanity, and since humanity, despite all changes, has also an oral and written
tradition, leaders do not merely come and then disappear from the eyes of mankind.. Rather they write
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I have in mind, first of all, Leibniz who dreamed of a language that would turn all inquiries in
mathematical problems that could be solved by calculation: “...if we could find characters or signs
appropriate for expressing all our thoughts as definitely and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers
or geometric analysis expresses lines, we could in all subjects in so far as they are amenable to
reasoning accomplish what is done in Arithmetic and Geometry.
“For all inquires which depend on reasoning would be performed by the transposition of characters
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